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Abstract
Much has been written about Iraqi refugees in the eight 
years since the March 2003 Anglo-American invasion 
of the country. Most of this work tries to understand the 
refugee crisis which followed from the perspective of “top-
down” governmental and institutional factors such as 
interstate relations, state fragility, and regional insecurity. 
Th e key innovation of this paper is that it explores “bottom-
up” factors. Th e focus of this paper is on the perceptions, 
interests, and perceived predicaments of displaced Iraqis 
themselves as contrasted with the perceptions of them by 
international players locally based in the Middle East 
region. As such the paper focuses on factors such as: live-
lihood strategies, economic engagement, protection rights, 
and alternatives to refugee/forced migration statuses. By 
reorienting analysis to local people-based perceptions the 
paper provides new ways of understanding not only the 
conditions of protracted displacement but also a broader 
scope for durable solutions.
Résumé
On a beaucoup écrit au sujet des réfugiés irakiens durant 
les huit années qui nous séparent de l’invasion anglo-amé-
ricaine de l’Irak en mars 2003. Une grande partie de cet 
article tente de mieux comprendre la crise des réfugiés 
favorisée par des facteurs tels que les relations internatio-
nales, la fragilité des états, et l’insécurité nationale et dont 
la source est au sommet de la société. Cet article innove 
en explorant aussi les facteurs dont la source est à la base 
de la société. Ainsi, on se penche sur les perceptions, les 
intérêts, et les situations diffi  ciles des Irakiens déplacés, en 
comparaison avec les perceptions qu’ont de ces derniers 
les acteurs internationaux actifs régionalement au Moyen 
Orient. Plus particulièrement, l’article se concentre sur des 
facteurs tels que la recherche de moyens de subsistance, 
l’engagement économique, les droits de protection, et les 
statuts alternatifs à ceux de réfugiés et de migrants forcés. 
En réorientant l’analyse sur les perceptions des personnes 
impliquées localement, cet article présente de nouvelles 
façons de comprendre non seulement les conditions des 
déplacements prolongés, mais off re aussi une approche 
plus large permettant de trouver des solutions durables.
Much has been written about Iraqi refugees in the eight years since the March 2003 Anglo-American invasion of the country. Most of this work tries to 
understand the refugee crisis which followed from the per-
spective of “top-down” governmental and institutional fac-
tors such as interstate relations, state fragility, and regional 
insecurity. Top-down approaches tend to be concerned 
with the three durable solutions (voluntary return, local 
integration, and resettlement). Hence, top-down analyses 
and policy implications are confi ned within this frame-
work and fail to explore other people-centred possibilities 
for unlocking the crisis. A key innovation of this paper is 
to prioritize an exploration of the “bottom-up” factors that 
aff ect the protracted Iraqi crisis. Here the focus is on the 
perceptions, interests, and perceived predicaments of dis-
placed Iraqis themselves as contrasted with the perceptions 
of them by international players locally based in the Middle 
East region. As such the paper focuses on factors such as: 
risk and livelihood strategies; social and economic engage-
ment, residence, and protection rights; and the growing 
reality of alternatives to refugee/forced migration statuses. 
By reorienting analysis to local people-based perceptions 
we provide new ways of understanding not only the con-
ditions of protracted displacement and but also a broader 
scope for durable solutions. Based on fi eldwork conducted 
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between April 18 and May 6, 2011, with locally based inter-
national players (UNHCR, IOM, UNRWA, Caritas, and the 
Canadian Mission), government and national NGO offi  cials 
(i.e. Red Crescent), as well as with Iraqi asylum seekers, refu-
gees, and temporary guests in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan 
this study brings to light the variations in understandings 
and interpretation between locally-based international 
players and Iraqi forced migrants themselves.
1. Background
Th e displaced population from Iraq now constitute one 
of the largest refugee population worldwide. Of nearly 5 
million Iraqis displaced by invasion, armed confl ict, and 
insecurity nearly 1.7 million are refugees1 and 2.8 million2 
are internally displaced within their own country. Iraqis 
are the second-largest group of displaced people seeking 
asylum in industrialized countries3 yet Western countries 
remain resistant to accepting them as refugees. Th e spatial 
separation of previously mixed sectarian and ethnic popula-
tions has rendered internal displacement a semi-permanent 
feature within Iraq, whilst those who have crossed inter-
national borders show little inclination to return except in 
very small numbers.4
Most of Iraq’s exiles are in the Middle East. Th eir refuge 
in the neighbouring countries of Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon 
is rapidly approaching the fi ve-year mark generally defi ned 
as a “protracted crisis.” Evidence, so far, suggests that the 
tolerance of their host governments will continue. Th is 
sanctuary, however, is a temporary reprieve and will not 
go on indefi nitely. Unwilling to return and largely unable 
to emigrate further west, Iraq’s refugees are in a perilous 
situation which needs to be addressed by the Western pow-
ers who created this humanitarian crisis.5
Iraqi refugees and Internally Displaced People (IDPs) 
have confounded the West from the beginning of the crisis 
which culminated in the mass fl ight of millions of people. 
Th eir predicaments and their perceptions have been poorly 
understood. Th eir risk strategies for survival and their will-
ingness to remain “unsettled” have also perplexed humani-
tarian actors. In the aft ermath of the invasion of Iraq in 
March 2003, few Iraqis actually had fl ed their country. 
Th e international aid regime had miscalculated the Iraqi 
peoples’ response to the invasion; the empty emergency 
camps were dismantled and pre-positioned food and equip-
ment were removed. Th ree years later in 2006 the West was 
caught off -guard as hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fl ed 
their homes to escape the deadly sectarian violence which 
had escalated in the February of that year. Nearly 4 million 
Iraqis fl ed their homes in 2006 and 2007 with 1 to 1.5 mil-
lion crossing national borders into Syria and Jordan. Th e 
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and affi  liated NGOs raced to set up reception centres and to 
provide emergency aid.
Despite a reduction in violence and confl ict since a peak 
in 2006–7, Iraq is far from stable and the Iraqi government 
has not been able to create the conditions for successful 
return, of either refugees or IDPs. Moreover, displacement is 
predominantly to urban locations, constituting a new chal-
lenge to humanitarian actors seeking to unlock the condi-
tions of protracted displacement. Furthermore, the insecur-
ity currently being felt in Syria has given rise to some return 
movement. Even if this proves to be of a temporary nature, 
it will further challenge humanitarian assistance eff orts in 
the region.
Despite a concerted eff ort over the past four years, 
UNHCR in Syria has registered only just over 200,000 
Iraqis. Th e reasons these fi gures are so low can only be 
guessed. Some Iraqis claim to fear involuntary repatria-
tion to Iraq if they formally register with the UN agency. 
Others fear returning to a country where the mixed ethno-
religious communities and the legacy of Ottoman tolerance 
have been wiped away. Th e targeting of Christians in 2010 
through the bombing of Iraqi churches in Baghdad clearly 
points to the continuing “unmixing” of peoples.
Th e Iraqi displacement crisis has reached a critical stage. 
International interest in Iraq is declining. Yet the lack of 
security, continuing civil confl ict, and economic uncertainty 
make it unlikely that a mass Iraqi return will occur. More 
likely, Iraqi refugees will remain in neighbouring states 
under increasingly diffi  cult circumstances. As their savings 
diminish and their movements into and out of Iraq to make 
Figure 1. Outfl ow of refugees to neighbouring countries
UNHCR, 2009 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum-seekers, Returnees, 
Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons, Division of Programme 
Support and Management, UNHCR, 2010 (last visited 15 June 
2011), http://www.unhcr.org.hk/fi les/unhcr/news/2009%20
Global%20Trends.pdf.
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money becomes more precarious, it is likely that irregular 
and long-distance migrations will occur in larger numbers. 
Unlocking this protracted crisis of displacement requires an 
understanding of the perceptions of solutions, durable and 
not so durable, among all stakeholders: Iraqi refugees and 
exiles, international humanitarian aid agencies, national 
NGOs, and host governments. Th e main aims of this study 
are to link existing research which emphasizes “top-down” 
governmental and institutional factors such as interstate 
relations, state fragility, and regional insecurity with an 
exploration of the “bottom-up” factors. Aft er a brief review 
of the existing literature, this paper focuses on the percep-
tions, interests, and perceived predicaments of displaced 
Iraqis themselves and factors such as: livelihood strategies; 
social and economic engagement, residence, and protection 
rights; and the growing reality of alternatives to refugee/
forced migration statuses. By linking a state/regional level 
analysis with local people-based perceptions (i.e. top-down 
and bottom-up) we anticipate increasing the potential to 
provide new ways of understanding not only the conditions 
of Iraqi displacement but also a broader scope for unlocking 
them. Responses of international players and national gov-
ernment offi  cials were gathered through interviews with 
national NGOs and international organizations working 
on Iraqi resettlement in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan. At the 
local level, interviews with Iraqi asylum seekers, refugees, 
and temporary guests were conducted in all three countries. 
A total of 21 interviews were conducted during the three-
week period between 18 April and 6 May 2011.6
2. Current Literature on the Displacement of Iraqis
Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and increasingly since 
the February 2006 bombing in Samarra’, it is believed that 
between 4 and 5 million Iraqis have been forced to leave 
their homes under conditions of violence and persecution in 
search of security elsewhere.7 Within this context, an esti-
mated but not easily verifi able 2.8 million Iraqis have been 
internally displaced, and another 2 million have sought ref-
uge abroad.8
It is widely understood that forced displacement is not 
a new phenomenon in Iraq. Displacement was eff ectuated 
in several waves that refl ect the political trajectory of the 
country.9 Decades of political persecution and devastating 
sanctions have pushed various groups of Iraqis to fl ee their 
homes and become internally displaced or exiled in the 
region and beyond. Indeed, Iraq has experienced periods 
of forced migration in the past and it is documented that 
well over 1 million Iraqis were already internally displaced 
or living in exile prior to the invasion.10
A mass displacement of Iraqis did not occur aft er the April 
2003 invasion;11 instead, it was the precipitous breakdown in 
security in 2006–7 which prompted the current crisis. Th e 
general consensus is that the displaced Iraqis have fl ed “as 
a consequence of a confl ict in which they have no stake but 
of which they were made victims.”12 Beyond ethnic or reli-
gious identity and minority status, reports cite employment 
by the United States or other foreign forces, personal wealth, 
and professional association as additional risk factors.13 
Compounding the real and perceived threats of violence, 
countless publications emphasize the widespread impover-
ishment of people within Iraq, and notably the middle class, 
as an important factor prompting out-migration.14
Th e Iraqis seeking refuge in neighbouring countries are 
faced with a hybrid model of protection that is refl ected 
in a precarious legal status.15 Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon 
are not signatories to the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and lack the domestic 
legal procedures for dealing with “refugees” or granting 
asylum.16 Initially Syria and Jordan welcomed their “Iraqi 
brethren” in the tradition of Arab brotherhood, classifying 
them as “guests” or “temporary visitors” and thus aff ording 
them temporary protection.17 In January 2007, the UNHCR 
opted to grant prima facie refugee status to all Iraqi nation-
als from central and southern Iraq, a designation accepted 
by the Syrian government but not the Jordanian state.18 
Nevertheless, the generosity shown by Syria and Jordan to 
the Iraqi refugees is widely recognized, standing in stark 
contrast to the negligence of donor countries and Iraq 
itself.19
Many reports have assessed the increasingly burden-
some impact of Iraqi refugees on their host countries and 
drawn analogies to the protracted Palestinian displacement 
of the 1950s.20 Across the board, reports indicate that local 
media and citizens blame the Iraqi refugees for their own 
deteriorating quality of life (rise in real estate prices, traf-
fi c jams, price rises, and utilities shortages) and perceive a 
far larger number of refugees than is actually present.21 Th e 
governments of Syria and Jordan cite massive expenditures 
on Iraqi refugees; with Syrian offi  cials claiming costs of 
over $1.5 billion per year and Jordanians quoting $1 billion, 
there is little doubt that the Iraqis have induced tangible 
economic pressures.
Th at said, the actual picture is more nuanced as exces-
sive blame is placed on Iraqis for issues that existed before-
hand, and alongside economic pressures has also come 
economic growth and investment.22 Furthermore, skilled 
and educated Iraqis with proper work permits substantially 
contribute to the regional economy.23 However, the nega-
tive perceptions cannot be ignored, nor can the actual costs 
incurred by the Syrian and Jordanian governments be dis-
missed—hostility towards Iraqis based on their perceived or 
actual burden on society is on the rise.24
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Th e prospect of refugee return to Iraq has garnered sig-
nifi cant attention recently, as improved security within Iraq 
has received global media coverage.25 Th e government of 
Iraq has introduced fi nancial incentives to encourage Iraqis 
to return and has urged the European Union to drop calls 
for taking in refugees to this eff ect.26 Yet despite these vocal 
political initiatives, humanitarian and human rights advo-
cates are extremely sceptical, pointing to a perilous secur-
ity situation and asserting that it would be “reckless” to 
encourage return before there were genuine and sustained 
improvements in security and the service provisions of the 
state.27 One small survey by the International Catholic 
Migration Commission (ICMC) that canvassed the opin-
ions of refugees in Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria demon-
strated that none of the 95 Iraqis interviewed believed that 
Iraq would stabilize in their own lifetime.28 At present, the 
sentiment is that “Iraq’s own government should start tend-
ing to the displaced population it has, rather than making 
political on the subject—and at the expense—of refugees.”29
Th e assistance and accommodation (local integration) 
of Iraqi refugees in their host countries is an issue of con-
cern among humanitarian organizations. Th e ambiguous 
nature of Iraqis’ legal status as “guests” prohibits them 
from gainful employment, pushing them into the exploita-
tive informal sector or, in some cases, “partnerships” with 
locals.30 Even those with legal status (residence permits or 
temporary visas) struggle to obtain work permits.31 Th ere is 
widespread unemployment, with some Iraqis risking brief 
and dangerous visits to Iraq to keep their businesses operat-
ing, collect pensions and food rations, and other activities 
for raiding income.32 Th ere has emerged a “climate of anx-
iety and fear of deportations among Iraqis” in some states.33 
It is the lack of employment opportunities which is cited as 
one of the main factors imperilling Iraqis’ livelihoods and 
curtailing their ability to aff ord suitable housing, health 
care, and education services.34
Even though the UNHCR has called upon the inter-
national community to do nothing that will compel the 
refugees to return to Iraq prematurely,35 there is very lit-
tle material that investigates the views and willingness of 
Iraqis to opt for third-country resettlement.36 Th at said, it 
has been found that one in fi ve Iraqis in Jordan had concrete 
plans to resettle in a third country, while 80 percent of the 
refugee population in Jordan (and Lebanon) do not intend 
to integrate into the host community, perceiving their stay 
as temporary.37 Family reunifi cation was also found to be a 
decisive factor when Iraqi families choose to fl ee from Iraq 
to neighbouring countries.38
Humanitarian and relief agencies, academics, advocacy 
and policy institutions have sought to elucidate the obstacles 
that exist to the provision of aid, assistance and protection, 
repatriation, and the possibilities of third-country resettle-
ment. Yet few studies have paid attention to the motivations 
of Iraq’s exiles for return, resettlement, or extended tempor-
ary residence in exile.
3. Local Level Perceptions: Policy Makers, 
Practitioners and Iraqi Exiles
During fi eldwork in April and May 2011, we were able to 
ascertain that while the profi les of Iraqis coming to the 
attention of the humanitarian agencies in Syria and Jordan 
consistently included families, Lebanon has witnessed a 
shift  from largely young single men and unaccompanied 
minors to families seeking third-country resettlement. In 
the recent period, UNHCR Lebanon has witnessed a surge 
in registration of Christian families fl eeing the wave of vio-
lence directed at the Iraqi Christian community in 2010. 
Policy makers also reported variations in the refugees’ 
motivations for selecting host countries despite a general 
drive for resettlement. Th ey reported, and this was gener-
ally confi rmed in our interviews with Iraqis, that those with 
links to the previous Iraqi regime and thus with slim chan-
ces for resettlement tended to opt to go to Syria or Jordan for 
long-term residence. Lebanon appeared to be sought aft er 
as a short-term destination, mainly by Christian refugees 
seeking resettlement.
All the interviewed policy makers remarked that none of 
three host states are signatories of the Geneva Convention; 
each state has adopted diff erent policies for hosting Iraqi 
refugees. Generally these are entertained with a careful eye 
to the long-term concerns regarding Tawtiin (integration or 
naturalization) and the forced migration of Palestinians in 
the region. Generally, these policy makers refl ected that the 
policies of the Syrian state were largely accommodating of 
Iraqi refugees—relaxed visa regime, open access to health 
and education, and easy entry into the informal economy. 
Jordan, they saw as less accommodating; it had recently 
tightened its policies regarding movement across its borders 
due to security claims. Unexpectedly, they felt, Lebanon has 
adopted the strictest policies in order to counter any claims 
for naturalization by Iraqis. In their offi  cial discourses, 
both Syria and Jordan consider Iraqis as temporary guests 
(duyuf) and are reluctant to use the term “refugees.” Iraqis 
themselves do not regard themselves as “refugees” and do 
not apply the term to describe their conditions.
Beyond the rhetoric, policy makers remarked that each 
of the three states imposed a diff erent set of legal measures 
regulating Iraqis’ residence, summed up by an initial tourist 
visa, and a long-term residence permit. Short-term tourist 
visas were relatively accessible. Since 1 February 2011, Iraqis 
could get a Syrian visa at the border, while they needed to 
secure them before arrival to Jordan and Lebanon. Once in 
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the host countries, Iraqis could renew these tourist visas for 
up to a year in most cases. Th e process was fairly straight-
forward but could become discretionary when implemented 
by the border controls. As one Iraqi man explained the tight 
checkups on his legal status:39
Once a civil offi  cer stopped me and asked for my ID, I showed 
him my UNHCR documents and he insisted on seeing my ID, he 
said “what is this?”, he didn’t respect an old man, I told him “I 
don’t have my passport with me, and that all the information is 
in UNHCR document, if you suspect with the information, call 
UNHCR they know everything”, and he asked me if I was Sunni 
or Shi’a. He has no right to do so. I told him “we are all Muslims, 
that is not your business, why are you asking?”. Th is happened to 
me, I don’t know if they do that to others.
Conversely, the residence type of visa was reported to be 
much harder to secure. Syrian regulations were the most 
lenient and granted refugees a three-month, renewable 
residence permit. However the procedures could become 
complicated. For example, refugees were required to submit 
offi  cial proof of residence through tenancy agreements. In 
some cases, landlords were reluctant to issue this document 
because they operated within an informal letting market.40 
As a result, some Iraqis do not manage to secure residence 
permits. Alternatively, Iraqis can secure work residence 
permits, but this incurs high costs and requires a national 
employer as a guarantor. Most importantly, the work per-
mits are exclusively restricted to certain less skilled and 
non-professional employment categories.
Within these restrictive legal frameworks, a large num-
ber of these Iraqi exiles are undocumented or have had 
their visa status lapse. Beyond a small portion of wealthy 
Iraqi families who settled mainly in Jordan, there is a large 
proportion of middle-class professionals who have become 
increasingly impoverished due to the protractedness of the 
crisis. An Iraqi woman, who fl ed to Lebanon with her family, 
explains their deteriorating fi nancial situation:41
My husband used to be the representative of the Minister of Justice 
aft er 2005. [ … ]. We received threats, calling him a conspirator 
with the Americans, a conspirator with the Cross, everything of 
this sort. [ … ]. I had some gold. I sold it and I came with the 
money. I used it to leave Iraq [ … ]. I need food, I need medication. 
We have nothing.
Iraqis are increasingly turning to the UNHCR and regis-
tering as refugees as their savings dry up.  However, a siz-
able proportion of Iraqis prefer not to be identifi ed because 
they had political links with the former regime. Th ey have 
little trust in UNHCR’s confi dentiality standards and fear 
that their details would be passed on to the Iraqi or US 
governments.42
In Lebanon, Iraqis are considered work migrants. Th e 
Lebanese Directorate of General Security has been act-
ively persecuting and detaining over-stayers. Even when 
the government grants occasional amnesty, it applies only 
to refugees who entered the country illegally and not those 
who overstayed their residences. As explained by one policy 
maker in Lebanon, there are around 100 detainees—found 
working without the correct papers—among registered 
refugees at any one time in Lebanon. Th ese tight measures 
disadvantage Iraqis who do not have the means to fi nance 
their stay or fi nd a guarantor employer. As a result, Iraqis in 
Lebanon are forced to take up informal jobs and are oft en 
exploited by employers. For example, a 45-year-old Iraqi 
arts teacher explains the constraints of his and his family’s 
movement resulting from overstaying their tourist visa:43
No, we are not legal. We do not even go out like the people who 
go out to have fun. We are afraid honestly, even my children. Th ey 
thank God, I have raised them well. Th ey are young people, 22 
and 21 years old, young people. Th ey don’t go out, only to work 
and back home because they are convinced that if one of us eight 
[him and his family] is caught, we will all be aff ected.
Low Rate of Voluntary Return
In all three countries policy makers stated that prospects 
for voluntary return do not seem promising; very few Iraqis 
have accepted the voluntary repatriation packages that 
have been off ered. UNHCR recently adopted a deregistra-
tion system in an attempt to assess numbers of returnees or 
onward-migrants. Syria and Jordan offi  ces deactivate fi les 
if the refugees do not show up for assistance over a period 
of six months or a year respectively. UNHCR Jordan saw 
the numbers of “active” registered refugees drop in the 
past two years from 60,000 to 32,000, while the numbers 
in Syria have remained relatively stable—as Iraqis return to 
Iraq, others leave. UNHCR Lebanon assumed that volun-
tary return fi gures in Lebanon would be very low.
UNHCR does not promote voluntary return and only 
off ers minimal return packages of 100 to 200 US dollars in 
addition to transportation costs. In Syria fewer than 200 
individuals used them in 2010; in Jordan 200 families used 
them in the past three years; and in Lebanon 42 individ-
uals used them in 2010. NGOs operating similar schemes 
have also faced little interest in return. Caritas, Jordan, 
for instance, had two families approach them for assisted 
return in 2010. One of the families spent a few months in 
Iraq and then moved back to Jordan shortly thereaft er. As a 
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result of this low demand, Caritas discontinued the volun-
tary return schemes.
However, the low offi  cial fi gures of return do not take 
into account a more fl uid and informal circular movement 
between Iraq and neighbouring countries. A Lebanon-based 
NGO conducted an internal assessment of the movement 
of 2,000 Iraqi benefi ciary families in 2010. Results showed 
that 400 families informally returned to Iraq either tem-
porarily or permanently. However, the scope and dynamics 
of this informal movement are discouraged at the offi  cial 
level as host states’ policies vary in terms of promoting or 
encouraging return. Jordan and Lebanon discourage return 
or “back and forth migration” by imposing a strict fi ve-year 
ban on refugees who leave the territory. Syria maintains 
practically an open door policy with many Iraqis moving 
back and forth regularly.
All Iraqi refugees—and most of the policy makers and 
practitioners we interviewed—regarded the precarious 
security situation in Iraq and the Iraqi government’s lack of 
support as the major reason for the low demand for assisted 
return schemes. Refugees who returned reported that their 
neighbourhoods have been segregated along sectarian lines, 
and experienced ethnic cleansing through threats and con-
fi scation of property:44
[My sister and I] used to work as inspectors in the church, we 
came out of the house in the morning, we saw an envelope in 
front of the house, there were 3 bullets in it. We were scared to 
death. We didn’t know what to do, but we had to go to church for 
inspection [ … ]. But aft er one month we received another threat, 
a paper in front of our door, threatening us: either we leave or we 
will be killed. Aft er these threats we understood that we were not 
threatened because of our work, but most probably because we 
were Christians, that is why we decided to leave Baghdad. [ … ]
Many of the refugees we spoke with reported that tar-
geted persecution—the main driver of their fl ight from 
Iraq—remained a concern and prevented them from seek-
ing return. Th ese refugees revealed that this category of 
refugee is diverse and includes Christian and other reli-
gious minorities, in addition to those from Sunni and Shi’a 
backgrounds who were persecuted either because of their 
affi  liation with the former regime, their involvement with 
the coalition forces, or the mixed marriages they contracted. 
Sometimes these factors were combined:45
As I was a university student, then I was a member of the party 
[ … ]. Our loyalty is for the country. We started receiving threats. 
And then we decided to leave, my father and I only. We left  with-
out anything. Only with the clothes I was wearing. We felt like we 
were thieves. I don’t know what to say. People were threatening 
us for what? And you didn’t do anything. Only because you were 
loyal to the nation? Only because you were a party member? So we 
had to leave. My family was divided. My mother as a Shi’a went 
back to her family, to her parents. She had to. She was forced to 
[ … ]. It was hard. So we decided to leave.
Overall it appears that the reduction in reported vio-
lence in Iraq in the last few years challenges the classical 
defi nitions of a “refugee” as one fl eeing but not returning. 
Th e growing circularity of migration among Iraqis in the 
Middle East challenges these ideas and defi nitional assump-
tions. According to one policy maker in Jordan, the rela-
tive reduction in violence increased the movement of Iraqis 
who returned home for specifi c reasons such as to check on 
their relatives, sell their assets, collect their pensions, and 
assess the security situation, fi rst-hand. Th ese return vis-
its, he added, do not imply that Iraqi refugees feel safe to 
return permanently. He explained further, “As far as we can 
tell they go in, do their task and come out, and if you ask 
them about the situation, they have taken a risk, it’s a cal-
culated risk. For some people the risk hasn’t paid off , they 
got killed.”46
As a result, many Iraqis return—temporarily—to Iraq 
without informing the organizations involved. For example, 
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some male heads of households go on their own to assess 
the situation, and later relocate their families accordingly.
Ongoing Local Accommodation in Lieu of Offi  cial Local 
Integration
Our interviews indicate that the boundaries between long-
term humanitarian assistance in protracted refugee situa-
tions and the prospects of “local integration” are blurred. 
Th e sensitivity to the protracted Palestinian refugee crisis 
has meant that the term “integration” is generally rejected 
by policy makers, practitioners, and Iraqis alike. However, 
the case of Iraq’s exiles and refugees suggests that a continu-
ous process of accommodation is taking place locally, with 
important implications in terms of the relations between 
host and refugee communities.
UNHCR has adapted a variety of forms of assistance in 
each country to respond to what it perceives is the scope of 
the refugee crisis in the state. Iraqi refugees are provided 
with food and cash distribution in Syria, cash distribution 
in Jordan, and food coupons in Lebanon. In Jordan, for 
example, UNHCR provides cash assistance to almost half 
of the active registered refugees (13,500), while some ser-
vice providers such as Caritas reported steady numbers of 
Iraqi benefi ciaries at around 8,000. In the three countries, 
NGOs provide skills and language training to men and 
women: technical training such as computer maintenance 
for men; while training for women focused on conventional 
skills such as hairdressing and sewing. In Lebanon, several 
NGOs provide legal services for detainees and assistance in 
securing work permits.
Despite the restrictive legal frameworks and the rejec-
tion of “local integration” as a durable solution, Iraqi exiles 
reported an ongoing process of accommodation in the three 
countries. Th is process was the outcome of new patterns of 
inter- and intra-social relations between host and refugee 
communities and within Iraqi communities. Th is ongoing 
accommodation was not problem-free as tensions between 
local and refugee communities were reported. While refu-
gees complained about meagre entitlements, locals felt 
threatened by competition over job opportunities, social 
provision, the rise in cost of living, and security.
Th ird-Country Resettlement
Th ird-country resettlement of Iraqis has faced many chal-
lenges in terms of burden sharing and refugees’ expecta-
tions. From the start of the crisis, Western countries’ 
responses have been unpredictable and varied. Th eir roles 
and responsibilities with regard to the Iraq War do not seem 
to have played a part in determining national resettlement 
quotas for Iraqi refugees. In the past few years, quotas for 
resettlement have dropped dramatically, mainly due to the 
withdrawal of European countries from the program. As 
one policy maker in Syria explained, “Iraq is the black spot 
that people want to sweep under the carpet and forget about. 
But the reality for Iraqi refugees is quite crisp.”47
Iraqi respondents felt that the Western states had an 
obligation to fulfi ll as an outcome of their roles in the war 
on Iraq. Th e majority of Iraqi refugees are reportedly inter-
ested in third-country resettlement. Whether due to gen-
eral insecurity in Iraq, or targeted persecution, Iraqi refu-
gees were creating transnational social networks as a way of 
ensuring their safety and reducing the risks they and their 
families face in exile. Dispersion along a vast transnational 
network including the US and Canada was increasingly 
common.48 Th e case of one refugee in Lebanon illustrated 
this point. He was one of four siblings who were all dis-
persed in various countries at various periods in the past 15 
years. He was based in Lebanon, with one brother in Jordan, 
another in Malta, and a sister in the US.49
Policy makers we interviewed clearly associated third-
country resettlement with the national economic, social, 
and political interests of the Western states. As one senior 
diplomat explained:50
Resettlement is not asylum. No country has an obligation to reset-
tle a refugee from a third-country. So it is not about providing 
protection in the legal sense. [ … ] And every country that I am 
aware of, including Canada has criteria based on whether or not 
you need protection as a refugee, but there are also some criteria 
that represent other national policy objectives. [ … ] Some of these 
criteria involve protecting the safety and security of Canadians.
Policy makers were at times informally critical of select-
ive criteria that disqualifi ed various categories of Iraqi refu-
gees. For example, several states exclude nationals associ-
ated with the former regime. Th is was seen as a particularly 
problematic exclusion as many of the middle-class profes-
sional Iraqi exiles were required to belong to the Baath party 
in order to work under the former regime. In some cases, 
Western resettlement criteria are set according to sectarian 
affi  liation. Germany and France were reported to be inter-
ested in resettling Christian refugees only, an issue opposed 
by UNHCR.51
Th e resettlement selection process also disadvantages the 
widespread Middle Eastern preference for extended families 
and households. Most resettlement missions are directed at 
nuclear families with children less than 18 years of age. Th is 
excludes adult children who usually live with their parents 
and elderly relatives such as grandparents. Th ese criteria 
add to the pressure on Iraqis who face leaving their family 
members behind. One elderly Iraqi in Jordan said:52
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As for the USA, I told them, I have a son in Syria who submitted 
his papers there. He is waiting his turn. If they allow me to go 
with my son to USA I will go. But I do not want to die alone, and 
be buried by others from another religion. I want to travel with 
my son; it is very diffi  cult for someone of my age to live alone in 
America.
Policy makers believed Iraqi refugees to be quite know-
ledgeable about the criteria for resettlement of various coun-
tries. Interviews with refugees, however, contradicted these 
assumptions. We found that refugees constructed know-
ledge of the conditions and criteria of resettlement schemes 
based on confl icting information circulated in their social 
networks. Refugees get caught up a cycle of trial and error 
and oft en resort to informal channels leading them to use 
irregular routes of migration to Western countries and 
seek asylum in them.53 Furthermore, refugees indicated 
that they did not receive regular updates about the status 
of their application. In Lebanon for instance, waiting times 
can go over a year without notifi cation. Th is issue was par-
ticularly distressing for refugees who were “left  hanging” 
for extended periods. One refugee in Lebanon likened the 
resettlement process to a matter of life and death:54 “One is 
waiting like hanging between the earth and the sky. If the 
string breaks you either fall on the ground and someone 
picks you up, or you go to the sky.”
Policy makers also pointed out that the conditions of 
resettlement at the country of destination included challen-
ges in terms of expectations of self-reliance, adaptation, and 
support. While 70 percent of registered refugees were uni-
versity graduates, they reported that refugees found it hard 
to settle for menial or less qualifi ed jobs in their resettle-
ment country.55 Refugees were also subjected to anxiety and 
stress in certain contexts as support packages varied from 
country to country. For example, the US off ered resettled 
refugees a support package for six months, aft er which time 
they were expected to work and repay it as their “loan.” As a 
result, many resettled Iraqis, especially the older generation 
and some vulnerable women, were giving up and returning 
to the host countries.56
4. Conclusion: Constraints, Innovations, and 
Accommodations
Th ree broad areas emerged from these local-level inter-
views in the exploration of the conditions and predicaments 
as well as possibly innovative solutions in this protracted 
crisis: reconceptualizing the term “refugee”; clarifying 
asylum and resettlement criteria; and encouraging local 
accommodation.
Policy makers, practitioners, and Iraqis we interviewed 
considered that a liberalized view of refugee movement 
was needed. Th e perceptions of policy makers refl ected a 
nuanced understanding of the realities of the protracted 
refugee crisis. Th ey did not completely subscribe to the 
dominant humanitarian framework of the three classical 
solutions. Equally they held a balanced view of the issues 
faced by refugees, agreeing with some and contesting others. 
Th ey all regarded security in Iraq as the major constraint 
Map 2. One family, transnational destination: Migrations of the extended family of an Iraqi respondent (REFSYR1)
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hindering Iraqis’ return to the country. Th ey also rec-
ognized that the fl uid movement of Iraqis back and forth 
to Iraq was an important mechanism for improving life 
opportunities and reducing family risk. Relaxing regula-
tions on border crossing across the three countries was con-
sidered potentially useful for the long-term solution to the 
crisis as it would allow members of refugee households to 
return temporarily and get a sense of the situation in Iraq. 
Th is mobility was a common feature of Iraqi exiles’ trans-
national networks, as one refugee mapped out:57
My parents are abroad; [ … ] my siblings are abroad. My brother is 
a naturalised American, and my mother needs a few more months 
to get it. My brother and sister are in Canada. My uncles are in 
Michigan. My uncle is in Australia; my cousin in Australia. My 
cousin is in Denmark and so on, we are an international family 
and you can fi nd us everywhere.
On the ground, international policy makers recognized 
the need to clarify and share information related to the 
criteria of resettlement. Several policy makers mentioned 
that the lengthy and unclear procedures of third-country 
resettlement kept “refugees hanging.”58 Some suggested the 
creation of a user-friendly manual of the requirements and 
criteria of resettlement would be valuable for use across all 
three countries.59
Policy makers also recognized the heavy baggage around 
ideas of local integration—a term widely rejected by the host 
states. Th ey all recognized that there was a growing category 
of Iraqis who were becoming “stuck” in host countries. Th is 
group included some of the most vulnerable categories such 
as the elderly left  behind aft er nuclear family resettlement, 
or less skilled young adults. For this group—especially the 
young—policy makers were concerned that work permits or 
a relaxation of labour laws should be considered by the host 
states to lessen Iraqi refugees’ dependency on humanitar-
ian aid. Refugees echoed these concerns. As one refugee in 
Lebanon stated:60
If I legalise my situation, I can go and come back as I want. I would 
be able to work in bigger fi rms. Now I have a computer mainten-
ance diploma, and I know a lot about these things. I went and 
applied to a company in Jounieh. Th ey fi x satellites and things like 
that. Th ey needed a work permit. And the salary was good salary, 
more than $1,000 [ … ]. If I had a residency permit, I would be 
able take up this job. But instead, I am working as a house keeper 
in a hotel. Is that a job for me? No it’s not, but what can I do?
Th e “refugees” of the Iraqi crisis do not fi t with Western 
conceptualizations of refugee law. Th eir fl ight has been 
a steady outfl ow for more than a decade, peaking in 
2006–7. Th e migration is not “one-way”; it is oft en circular 
and involves movement in and out of Iraq as well as across 
wider transnational networks in the Middle East and fur-
ther afi eld. Th is mobility is a result of the protractedness 
of their situations and includes a strategy of managing life 
risks by dispersal of family members along pre-established 
social networks whenever possible. Iraqi mobility is part 
of the reality of this protracted refugee crisis. It needs to 
be recognized as a risk management strategy for refugees 
for whom the three classic durable solutions are largely 
inapplicable. Unfortunately this mobility is oft en looked at 
sceptically by many in the humanitarian aid regime as it 
raises questions regarding how well Iraqis fi t into the “cat-
egory” of refugee.
Notes
 1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR), UNHCR Syria Update. UNHCR, May 2008, 
last visited 7 July 2008, http://www.un.org.sy/publications
/UNHCR%20Syria%20Update%20May%202008.pdf. 
 2. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2009, 
http://www.internal-displacment.org/idmc/website
/countries.nsf; IDMC, 2010, Global Overview of Trends 
and Developments in Internal Displacement, http://www
.internal-displacment.org/idmc/website/countries.nsf. 
 3. UNHCR, Report on Asylum Levels and Trends in Indus-
trialized Countries, UNHCR, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org
/pages/49c3646c4d6.html.
 4. P.  Marfl eet and D. Chatty, Iraq’s Refugees: Beyond ‘Toler-
ance,’ RSC Forced Migration Policy Brief no. 4 (Oxford: 
Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, 2003).
 5. Ibid.
 6. Preliminary contacts for interviews were established 
through the offi  ces of the UNHCR. Once in-country, a 
snowball technique was used to arrange for further policy-
maker and practitioner interviewing. Interviews with 
Iraqis were arranged purposively, with the actual selection 
of interviewees made by the NGO or UN Agency staff . 
 7. International Crisis Group (ICG), Failed Responsibility: 
Iraqi Refugees in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, 10 July 2008, 
77: 1–42; Th e Middle East Institute (MEI), Iraq’s Refu-
gee and IDP Crisis: Human Toll and Implications, View-
points Special Edition, Washington, DC, MEI, 2008, last 
visited 17 June 2011, http://www.mei.edu/Publications
/WebPublications/Viewpoints/ViewpointsArchive/
tabid/541/ctl/Detail/mid/1623/xmid/190/xmfid/11/
Default.aspx; Amnesty International (AI), Iraq, Rhetoric 
and Reality: Th e Iraqi Refugee Crisis, London, AI Index: 
MDE 14/011/2008, London, 15 June, 2008a, 1–66; UNHCR, 
Global Trends, UNHCR, 2008, last visited 10 June 2011, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4a375c426.html. 
 8. AI, Iraq: Suff ering in Silence: Iraqi Refugees in Syria, 12 May 
2008, MDE 14/0110/2008, (last visited 26 July 2012), http://
 Displaced Iraqis: Predicaments and Perceptions in Exile in the Middle East 
105
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4847a4841f.html; Inter-
national Organization for Migration (IOM), Assessment 
of the Psychosocial Needs of Iraqis Displaced in Jordan and 
Lebanon, IOM Survey Report, IOM, Amman and Beirut, 
February 2008; ICG, Failed Responsibility, 77: 1–42; Inter-
national Rescue Committee (IRC), Five Years Later, A Hid-
den Crisis, Report of the IRC Commission on Iraqi Refu-
gees, March 2008; UNHCR, Asylum Levels 2009.
 9. See G. Chatelard, O. el-Abed, and K. Washington, Pro-
tection, Mobility and Livelihood Challenges of Displaced 
Iraqis in Urban Settings in Jordan, International Catholic 
Migration Commission, 2009 (last visited 21July 2009), 
http://www.icmc.net/pubs/protection-mobility-and
-livelihood-challenges-displaced-iraqis-urban-settings
-jordan; G. Chatelard, “A Quest for Family Protection: Th e 
Fragmented Social Organisation of Transnational Iraqi 
Migration” (keynote speech to the conference Displace-
ment and Dispossession: Forced Migration in Africa and 
the Middle East, British Academy, London, 28 March 
2008; P.  Marfl eet, “Iraq’s Refugees: ‘Exit’ from the State,” 
International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies 1, no. 3 
(2007): 397–419.
 10. Chatelard, ”A Quest for Family Protection”; Middle East 
Report (MERIP), Displaced, Iraqis in Jordan and Syria 
(MERIP 37, no. 3 (2007): 2–24, 22; Human Rights Watch 
(HRW), “Iraqi Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Displaced 
Persons: Current Conditions and Concerns in the Event of 
War,” Human Rights Watch Briefi ng Papers, 13 February 
2003, 1- 25; for detailed statistics see D. Romano “Whose 
House Is Th is Anyway? IDP and Refugee Return in Post-
Saddam Iraq,” Journal of Refugee Studies 18, no. 4 (2005): 
430–53.
 11. D. Chatty, “‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ and Its Phantom 
Million Iraqi Refugees,” Forced Migration Review (18 Sep-
tember 2003): 51. 
 12. ICG, Failed Responsibility, 1.
 13. ICG, Failed Responsibility; MEI, Iraq’s Refugee; A. al-Khal-
idi, S. Hoff mann, and V. Tanner, Iraqi Refugees in the Syrian 
Arab Republic: A Field-Based Snapshot (Washington, DC: 
Th e Brookings Institution–University of Bern Project on 
Internal Displacement, 2007.)
 14. AI, Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality; al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi Refu-
gees; “Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Th e Search for Solutions,” 
Special Issue, Forced Migration Review (FMR) (June 2007): 
1–52, http://www.fmreview.org/iraq.htm; J. Sassoon, Th e 
Iraqi Refugees: Th e New Crisis in the Middle East (Lon-
don and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2009). See also MEI, Iraq’s 
Refugee, 41; al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi Refugees; FMR, Iraq’s 
Displacement Crisis; F. Marfl eet, “Iraq’s Refugees: ‘Exit’ 
from the State,” International Journal of Contemporary 
Iraqi Studies 1, no. 3 (2007): 397–419; J. Steele, “Th e Iraqi 
Brain Drain,” Th e Guardian, 24 March 2006, last visited 
June 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/mar/24
/iraq.jonathansteele.
 15. AI, Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality; ICG, Failed Responsibility; 
MERIP, Displaced.
 16. G. Chatelard, K. Washington, and O. el-Abed, An Assess-
ment of Services Provided for Vulnerable Iraqis in Jor-
dan, Report commissioned by AUSTCARE- Middle East 
Regional Offi  ce, Ramallah (September 2007, updated Feb-
ruary 2008), 1–38; Human Rights Watch (HRW), “Jordan: 
Th e Silent Treatment: Fleeing Iraq, Surviving in Jordan,” 
Human Rights Watch 18, no. 10 (November 2006); HRW, 
“Rot Here or Die Th ere: Bleak Choices for Iraqi Refugees in 
Lebanon,” HRW 19, no. 8 (November 2007); AI, Iraq, Rhet-
oric and Reality.
 17. ICG, Failed Responsibility; G. Chatelard, “A Quest for 
Family Protection: Th e Fragmented Social Organisation 
of Transnational Iraqi Migration” (keynote speech to the 
conference “Displacement and Dispossession: Forced 
Migration in Africa and the Middle East,” British Academy, 
London, 28 March 2008); P. Fagen, Iraqi Refugees: Seeking 
Stability in Syria and Jordan (Doha: Institute for the Study 
of International Migration, Georgetown University School 
of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2007), 1–39; FMR, Iraq’s Dis-
placement Crisis.
 18. A. Harper, “Iraq’s Refugees: Ignored and Unwanted,” Inter-
national Review of the Red Cross 90, no. 869 (March 2008): 
169–90; P. Fagen, Seeking Stability, 5–6; L. Al-Zubaidi and 
H. Wimmen, No Place Home: Iraqi Refugees between Pre-
carious Safety and Precipitous Return (Beirut: Henrich Böll 
Stift ing, 2008).
 19. Harper, “Iraq’s Refugees”; ICG, Failed Responsibility; AI, 
Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality; HRW, Silent Treatment.
 20. ICG, Failed Responsibility, 11; Fagen, Seeking Stability, 6; al-
Khalidi et al., Iraqi Refugees, 40; FMR, Iraq’s Displacement 
Crisis.
 21. Offi  ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff airs 
(OCHA), Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP): Mid-Year 
Review of the Appeal 2009 for Iraq and the Region, 2009, 
OCHA, last visited 22 July 2009, http://reliefweb.int/rw/rwb
.nsf/db900sid/AMMF-7TYT9E?OpenDocument&cc=irq; 
J. Kurtzer, Iraq: Keeping Our Focus, 2009, last visited 22 July 
2009, www.refugeesinternational.org/blog/iraq-keeping
-our-focus; A. Evans Barnes, “Realizing Protection Space 
for Iraqi Refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon” 
(UNHCR, New Issues in Refugee Research, research 
paper 167, 2009), last visited 29 June 2009, http://www
.unhcr.org/49813ab2.html; ICG, Failed Responsibility, 15; 
K. O’donnell and K. Newland, Th e Iraqi Refugee Crisis: Th e 
Need for Action (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Insti-
tute, 2008); Fagen, Seeking Stability; al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi 
Refugees, 40.
 22. ICG, Failed Responsibility, 13; Fagen, Seeking Stability; N. 
Seeley, “For Some Iraqi War Refugees, Business Is Boom-
ing,” Th e Christian Science Monitor, 10 June 2008, last vis-
ited October 2008, http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0611
/p07s01-wome.html.
 23. IRC, Five Years Later, 7.
Volume 28 Refuge Number 1
106
 24. Barnes, “Realizing Protection Space”; R. Leenders, “Iraqi 
Refugees in Syria: Causing a Spillover of the Iraqi Confl ict?” 
Th ird World Quarterly 29, no. 8 (2008): 1563–84; S. K. 
Lischer, “Security and Displacement in Iraq: Responding 
to the Forced Migration Crisis,” International Security 
33, no. 2 (Fall 2008): 95–119; ICG, Failed Responsibility; 
MERIP, Displaced; Fagen, Seeking Stability, 19; al-Khalidi et 
al., Iraqi Refugees. 
 25. E. Ferris and K. Stoltz, Minorities, Displacement and Iraq’s 
Future, Washington D.C., Th e Brookings Institution, 2008 
(last visited 20 June 2009), http://www.brookings.edu
/papers/2008/1223_minorities_ferris.aspx; Heinrich Böll 
Stift ung (HBS), What Can Europe Do in Iraq? Recommen-
dations for a New U.S.-European Collaboration, Publication 
series on Democracy, vol. 11 (Berlin: Heinrich Böll Stif-
tung, 2009), last visited 30 June 2009, http://www.boell.de
/publications/publications-6137.html; UNHCR, UNHCR 
revises guidelines for Iraqi asylum claims, UNHCR, 2009 
(last visited 30 June 2009), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw
/rwb.nsf/db900SID/LSGZ-7RRDVC?OpenDocument; AI, 
Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality; ICG, Failed Responsibility.
 26. IRIN, “Iraq: Refugees Could Fuel Regional Instability, 
Experts Say,” IRIN News, 20 June 2008, last visited 7 July 2008, 
http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=78841; 
Reuters, “Iraq Still Too Fragile to Take Back Refugees,” 2 
June 2009, last visited 11 October 2009, http://www.reuters
.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSL2602950._CH_.2400.
 27. UNHCR, UNHCR revises guidelines; ICG, Failed Respon-
sibility, ii; AI, Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality.
 28. F. Riller, Observations and Recommendations on the 
Resettlement Expectations of Iraq Refugees in Lebanon, Jor-




 29. Chatelard et al., Protection.
 30. See al-Khalidi et al., Iraqi Refugees, 35; IOM, Psychosocial 
Needs; ICG, Failed Responsibility; Fagen, Seeking Stability.
 31. Chatelard et al., Assessment of Services.
 32. IRC, Five Years Later, 6; AI, Iraq, Suff ering in Silence, 7.
 33. Chatelard et al., Assessment of Services, 11.
 34. AI, Iraq, Rhetoric and Reality; IOM, Psychosocial Needs, 49; 
ICG, Failed Responsibility; MERIP, Displaced; UNHCR, 
Iraq Bleeds: Millions Displaced by Confl ict, Persecution and 
Violence, REFUGEES, 2007, 146 (2): 1–31 (last visited 7 July 
2008), http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/4614f5802.pdf.
 35. UNHCR, UNHCR revises guidelines.
 36. Riller, Observations.
 37. Ibid.
 38. Chatelard et al., Protection.
 39. Interview with Iraqi refugee (REFJOD5) in Amman, Jor-
dan, 3 May 2011.
 40. Interview with policy maker (PMSYR2) in Damascus, 
Syria, 18 April 2011.
 41. Interview with Iraqi refugee (REFLEB1) in Beirut, Lebanon, 
5 May 2011.
 42. Interviews with policy makers in Syria, Jordan.
 43. Interview with Iraqi refugee (REFLEB3) in Beirut, Lebanon, 
5 May 2011.
 44. Joint interview with Iraqi refugee family (REFJOD1, 
REFJOD2, REFJOD3) in Amman, Jordan, 3 May 2011.
 45. Interview with Iraqi refugee (REFLEB2) in Beirut, Lebanon, 
5 May 2011.
 46. Interview with policy maker (PMJOD1) in Amman, Jor-
dan, 2 May 2011.
 47. Interview with policy maker (PMSYR3) in Damascus, 
Syria, 20 April 2011.
 48. A. Monsutti, “Afghan Migratory Strategies and the Th ree 
Solutions to the Refugee Problem,” Refugee Survey Quar-
terly 27, no. 1 (2008): 58–73.
 49. Interview with REFLEB2. 
 50. Interview with senior diplomat (SENDIP1) in Damascus, 
Syria, 18 April 2011.
 51. Interview with PMSYR3.
 52. Interview with REFJOD5.
 53. Interview with PMSYR2.
 54. Interview with REFLEB3.
 55. Interview with PMJOD4.
 56. Interview with policy maker (PMJOD5) in Amman, Jor-
dan, 4 May 2011.
 57. Interview with Iraqi refugee (REFLEB2) in Beirut, Lebanon, 
5 May 2011.
 58. Interview with PMLEB4.
 59. Interview with PMSYR3.
 60. Interview with REFLEB2.
Dawn Chatty is Director of the Refugee Studies Centre and 
Professor of Anthropology and Forced Migration in the Oxford 
Department of International Development, University of 
Oxford. Nisrine Mansour is a Research Fellow in the Refugee 
Studies Centre.
 Displaced Iraqis: Predicaments and Perceptions in Exile in the Middle East 
107

